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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 17037 
RONALD G. CLARK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with theft, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Sections 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1) {b} (iii), 
U.C.A. (1953), as amended, for stealing three turkeys from a 
turkey farm near Ephraim, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At a bench trial on February 11, 1980, appellant was 
convicted as charged. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction on constitu-
tional grounds. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was charged by information with the offense 
of theft, a felony of the third degree, to which appellant 
entered a plea of not guilty. (R., pp. 5-6) 
At a bench trial commencing February 11, 1980, respondent 
called as witnesses Richard Olsen and Douglas Olsen, owners of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a turkey farm near Ephraim, Utah. The Olsens testified that 
in the early morning hours of October 19, 1979, they heard or 
saw the appellant club three turkeys to death in a turkey pen 
on their farm. They further testified that appellant was 
carrying the turkeys to his truck when they challenged him, 
and he dropped them inside the pen. A discussion ensued and 
appellant was thereafter arrested and charged., (Tr., pp. 14-26) 
After a stipulation between counsel concerning the 
admission of exhibits and testimony of the investigating officer, 
respondent rested its case. 
Appellant's attorney then moved to dismiss the charge 
on the basis that the State failed to prove all of the elements 
necessary to constitute theft. (Tr., pp. 30-·32) The Court 
denied the motion and appellant rested and submitted the case. 
The Court then found the appellant guilty as charged and 
ordered a presentence report to be prepared. At that time, the 
Court stated on the record that he considered the matter to be 
extremely serious and particularly to the community where the 
offense occurred. (Tr., pp. 33-34) 
The sentencing proceeding was held on April 9, 1980. 
At that time, the Court placed appellant on probation for two 
years, imposed a fine of $1,500.00, ordered restitution of 
$45.·oo (the value of the 3 turkeys) and ordered that appellant 
serve 90 days in jail as a condition of probation. 
During the sentencing proceeding,. the Court made several 
references to making an example of the appellant based upon 
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the attitudes of the community and particularly the turkey 
farmers and livestock producers. (Tr., pp. 47-50. 
At one point, the Court compared the theft of the turkeys 
to a homicide and otherwise indicated that the severity of the 
sentence was intended as a warning to others. (Tr., p. 47) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 76-6-412 (1) (b) (iii) I 
U.C.A. (1953) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of 
Utah guarantee equal protection of the law. 
The test of a statute for purposes of equal protection, 
absent some form of invidious discrimination, is that the 
statute must be grounded upon a rational basis.. McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 
(1961) Thus, if there is no rational basis for a discrimination 
as to the classification of a criminal offense, then such a 
classification must fail as a denial of equal protection. 
Appellant asserts that the classification of theft of 
poultry as a third degree felony constitutes a denial of equal 
protection in that Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) makes no 
reference to the value of the animals stolen in determining 
the felonious nature of the offense. 
The standard for defining the value of property in 
determining the degree of theft as to ordinary personal 
-3-
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property is the "market value" of the stolen items. State v. 
Logan , 5 6 3 P . 2 d 811 (Utah 19 7 7} 
There exists no valid reason why the theft of domestic 
animals should not also be classified into degrees based upon 
the market value of the animals. In the instant case, the value 
of the stolen turkeys was $45.00 which, under Section 76-6-412 
(1) (d), U.C.A. (1953), would constitute only a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
Appellant concedes that, at common law, there may have 
been a justification for classifying theft of domestic animals 
as grand larceny. In centuries past, agriculture was characterized 
by the small family farm, whereby the theft of a single horse 
.or cow may well have jeopardized the economic survival of a 
family. 
To equate agrarian conditions as they existed at conunon 
law with modern life is preposterous at best. The modern live-
stock industry is characterized by large mechanized and auto-
mated farms engaged in the production of thousands of animals 
for market. 
Thecpplication of Utah's livestock theft statute is such 
that larceny of 3 live turkeys from a turkey farm is felonious 
while theft of the same 3 turkeys, slaughtered and packaged, 
from a grocery store is punishable only as a misdemeanor. 
To contend that an animal intended for slaughter is intrinsically 
more valuable to the farmer who raises it than to the grocer 
who retails it is a proposition so irrational as to be absurd. 
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As a separate equal protection challenge, Section 76-6-
412, U.C.A. (1953), when construed as a whole, invests a 
prosecutor with the discretion to charge a person with a felony 
or misdemeanor for the same act. Thus, for the act involved 
herein, the prosecutor could elect to pursue the matter as a 
Class B misdemeanor based on the value of the turkeys or, 
as in appellant's case, he could treat the matter as a felony. 
The comparison extends even further in that a statute 
separate from the theft statutes would also classify appellant's 
act as a Class B misdemeanor. Inasmuch as the turkeys were 
clubbed to death, the prosecution could have elected to proceed 
against appellant for a misdemeanor under Section 76-9-301, 
U.C.A. (1953) for cruelty to animals. 
Thus, not only is there no rational basis for the classi-
fication of theft of poultry as a felony, the livestock theft 
statute, in its application, must be found to violate equal 
protection by allowing a prosecutor to charge either a felony 
or misdemeanor based upon the same set of facts. State v. 
Blanchey, 454 P.2d 841 (Wash. 1969); State v. Langworthy, 
Wash. App., 583 P.2d 1231 (1978). 
Appellant asserts that Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii), 
should be held unconstitutional as violative of equal protection 
on either or both of the bases set forth above. 
-5-
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POINT II 
SECTION 76-6-412 (.1) (b) (iii) 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A 
VIOLATION OF THE PROHIBITION 
OF PRIVATE OR SPECIAL LAWS 
Article VI, Section 26 of the Constitution of Utah pro-
hibits the enactment of private or special laws "where a general 
law can be applicable." Appellant contends that such is the 
case with regard to Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii). The general 
theft provisions which classify offenses on the basis of value 
are available to prosecute one who steals poultry. 
The effect of Utah's livestock theft statute is to pro-
vide special criminal sanctions intended to protect a private 
industry, namely livestock and poultry raising. 
Once again, the test for classifications as to special 
or private laws is that of reasonableness. Utah Farm Bureau 
Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guaranty Assn., 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 19.77) 
Appellant contends that, once again, Utah's livestock theft 
statute fails that test. 
Utah's statute is particularly suspect in that, historically, 
theft of poultry was not included as a felony offense. The 
provision adding poultry to the list of domestic animals as to 
which larceny constituted a felony was only enacted by the Utah 
legislature in 1977. It is apparent that the recent inclusion 
of poultry is a response to lobbying by Utah's substantial 
turkey raising industry. 
At least as to the larger, hoofed domestic animals there 
might exist a valid presumption that, in view of modern prices, 
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even the value of one such animal would be sufficient to 
constitute felony theft on a market value basis. Clearly, the 
same presumption would not apply to a single turkey. 
A review of surrounding jurisdictions indicates that 
those which have affirmed the constitutionality of felony theft 
laws concerning domestic animals have involved statutes which 
define livestock as hoofed animals, not poultry. State v. 
Feeley, 552 P.2d 66 (Mont. 1976); State v. Pacheco, 81 N.M. 
97, 463 P.2d 521 (1969); Houser v. Fourth Judicial District 
Court, 345 P.2d 766 (Nev. 1959). 
The inclusion of poultry in Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) 
is a clear violation of the constitutional prohibition against 
special legislation and mandates a reversal of appellant's 
conviction. 
POINT III 
THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT 
WAS EXCESSIVE AND ARBITRARILY 
AND PREJUDICIALLY IMPOSED 
Assuming, arguendo, that the statute under which 
appellant was convicted is constitutionally valid, the sentence 
in appellant's case was unduly harsh and imposed prejudicially 
in response to pressure from the community and special interests. 
During the sentencing proceeding, the Court referred to 
pressure on the prosecutor by the farm cormnunity and livestock 
and poultry interests to seek a harsh penalty for appellant. 
(Tr., pp. 47-48) 
Further, the court noted the desire of the community, 
reflecting his own inclination, to make an example of appellant. 
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At one point, the Court even compared the offense in degree 
of seriousness to a homicide. (Tr. , pp. 4 7- 5 0) 
Appellant asserts that the imposition of a lengthy 
period of probation, 90 days imprisonment and a stiff fine of 
$1,500.00 was motivated, not by a concern for justice, but 
rather by a concern for the protection of the property rights 
of a special interest group, the livestock and poultry farmers. 
Appellant contends the severity of the penalty imposed 
bore no relation to the nature of the offense of stealing 3 
turkeys worth $45.00 nor with the appellant's character, i.e., 
no serious prior criminal record and a stable background and 
employment history. 
Consequently, appellant urges the Court, alternatively, 
to find the sentence of the trial court to be excessive and 
arbitrarily imposed, despitethe fact that it was within the 
statutory limits for a third degree felony. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests the Court to find the relevant statute 
unconstitutional and reverse his conviction. 
. -~'? t DATED th.is .-.::<-~ \.·,day of September, 1980. 
\ 
ROBERT VAN 1SCIVER < 
Attorney for Appellant 
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